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Abstract
This Note argues that U.S. courts must permit an extradited individual to invoke treaty rights
under the doctrine of speciality. Part I traces the history of extradition and the development of
the doctrine of speciality. Part II analyzes the cases that address the issue of individual rights and
the doctrine of speciality. Part III argues that extradition treaties vest defendants with the right
to invoke the doctrine of speciality’s protection. This Note concludes that defendants must be
granted the right to raise violations of the doctrine of speciality to protect the integrity and purpose
of extradition treaties.
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE DOCTRINE OF
SPECIALITY: THE DETERIORATION OF
UNITED STATES v. RAUSCHER
INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of speciality' represents one method by
which parties to an extradition treaty control, and insure the
integrity of, the extradition process. 2 The doctrine of special-
ity embodies the theory in international law that compels the
requesting state to prosecute the extradited individual upon
only those offenses for which the requested country granted
extradition.3 Accordingly, extradited individuals often claim
1. The term "speciality" often appears as "specialty." In fact, significant disa-
greement exists over which term to use. See Blakesley, Extradition Between France and
the United States: An Exercise In Comparative and International Law, 13 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 653, 706 n.187 (1980). This Note adopts the historical and international
approach taken by the many authorities who have chosen to use the term "speciality"
as a closer approximate of "sp6cialit6," the original term used by the French. See I.
SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 146 n.3 (1971); see also Kester, Some
Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEo. L.J. 1441, 1466 (1988) (using term spe-
ciality); 6 BRITISH DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 577-649 (1965) (using speciality).
But see M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADrION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRAC-
TICE 359-71 (2d rev. ed. 1987) (using specialty); Research in International Law Under the
Auspices of the Faculty of the Harvard Law School, Extradition, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 213
(Supp. 1935) (using specialty) [hereinafter Harvard Research Project]; Note, Toward a
More Principled Approach to the Principle of Specialty, 12 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 309 (1979)
(using specialty). It appears that the term "specialit6," as used by the French, refers
to the "special" or "specific" character of extradition that prevents trial of the de-
fendant on charges unlisted in the extradition agreement. See 1 J. MOORE, TREATISE
ON EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION 234-37 n.1 (1891). The usage of the
term speciality is also helpful to distinguish its use from other branches of law.
2. See M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 360.
3. See, e.g., Harvard Research Project, supra note 1, at 231. Article 17 of the extradi-
tion treaty between the United States and Mexico provides an example of how speci-
ality is incorporated into the terms of the treaty:
1. A person extradited under the present Treaty shall not be detained, tried
or punished in the territory of the requesting Party for an offense other than
that for which extradition has been granted nor be extradited by that Party
to a third State unless:
(a) He has left the territory of the requesting Party after his extradition
and has voluntarily returned to it;
(b) He has not left the territory of the requesting Party within 60 days
of being free to do so; or
(c) The requested Party has given its consent to his detention, trial,
punishment or extradition to a third State for an offense other than that
for which the extradition was granted.
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treaty rights under the doctrine of speciality.4 Many courts and
authorities, however, believe that extradition treaties, and
therefore the doctrine of speciality, confer rights only upon na-
tions as parties to the treaties, and not upon the individuals
subjected to the extradition.5 Some courts adhering to this
view have proceeded to deny extradited individuals the right to
raise violations of the doctrine of speciality.6
This Note argues that U.S. courts must permit an extra-
dited individual to invoke treaty rights under the doctrine of
speciality. Part I traces the history of extradition and the de-
velopment of the doctrine of speciality. Part II analyzes the
cases that address the issue of individual rights and the doc-
trine of speciality. Part III argues that extradition treaties vest
defendants with the right to invoke the doctrine of speciality's
protection. This Note concludes that defendants must be
granted the right to raise violations of the doctrine of speciality
to protect the integrity and purpose of extradition treaties.
I. THE HISTORY OF EXTRADITION AND SPECIALITY
A. Extradition Through the Ages
Extradition represents the formal diplomatic process by
which one country petitions a second country to apprehend
and return a fugitive from the former country living within the
2. If, in the course of the procedure, the classification or the offense is
changed for which the person requested was extradited, he shall be tried
and sentenced on the condition that the offense, in its new legal form:
(a) is based on the same group of facts established in the request for
extradition and in the documents presented in its support; and
(b) is punishable with the same maximum sentence as the crime for
which he was extradited or with a lesser sentence.
Extradition Treaty, United States-Mexico, May 4, 1978, 31 U.S.T. 5059, T.I.A.S. No.
9656.
4. See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886); United States v. Najohn,
785 F.2d 1420 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1009 (1986); see also Kester, supra note
1, at 1467.
5. E.g., United States ex. rel. Donnelly v. Mulligan, 76 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1935);
see 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 702 (8th ed. 1955); infra notes 75-152 and
accompanying text (discussing courts viewing speciality as exclusive right of re-
quested country).
6. E.g., United States v. Kaufman, 874 F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1989) (denying peti-
tion for rehearing); see infra notes 129-52 and accompanying text (discussing courts
denying individual right to raise speciality violations).
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legal jurisdiction of the latter country. In extradition law the
terms "requested country" and "requesting country" pertain
to the extraditing country and the petitioning country respec-
tively.8 The individual subject to extradition is called the rela-
tor.9 While considerable debate surrounds the history of ex-
tradition, most authorities agree that some form of extradition
has existed since antiquity.' 0
The first documented extradition agreement in history
dates back to the year 1280 B.C." Ramses II, Pharaoh of
7. See Blakesley, supra note 1, at 654-55. In many situations, however, extradi-
tion may present problems of feasibility. See M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 190. This
may occur, for example when extradition is sought from countries which do not ex-
tradite their own nationals. See Blakesley, supra note 1, at 690-91 (discussing
problems with clauses barring extradition of nationals); see also Harvard Research Pro-
ject, supra note 1, at 236-39 (discussing non-extradition of nationals). These
problems also arise when the government of a country seeking a fugitive from its laws
believes that the diplomatic channels of the country where the fugitive resides do not
adequately protect the information contained in an extradition request. See
Abramovsky, Extraterritorial Abductions: America's "Catch and Snatch" Policy Run Amok, 31
VA.J. INT'L L. 151 (1991). It is believed the fugitive may discover his pending extra-
dition and flee to a safer country before he is apprehended. Id. at 181. These obsta-
cles to prosecution by way of extradition have given rise to the unorthodox and
highly controversial use of officially sanctioned unilateral abductions. See, e.g., United
States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir 1991); United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745
F. Supp. 599 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (divesting jurisdiction after finding abduction of de-
fendant violated extradition treaty between United States and Mexico).
8. See, e.g., M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 359-60 (using terms "requested" and
"requesting" country).
9. See, e.g., id. at 361 (using term relator).
10. See Blakesley, The Practice of Extradition from Antiquity to Modern France and the
United States: A Brief Hist-y, 4 B.C. INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 39 (1981). According to
Professor Blakesley, the debate surrounding the history of extradition focuses on the
characteristics of the extradition process in antiquity as compared with modern extra-
dition. Id. at 41-47. He concludes that
although there was no constant practice or development of a science of ex-
tradition in antiquity, many ancient societies sought the return of common
criminals. These renditions had some characteristics similar to those of
modern extradition. Often the request was made "officially" through the
respective "sovereigns." Rendition was sought for "common" and political
type crimes.
Id. at 47. Some authorities argue, however, that the arbitrary and predominantly
political nature of ancient extradition supports the conclusion that modern extradi-
tion has little in common with its ancient version. See M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at
7. This argument contends that the objects of ancient extradition were the political
and religious enemies of the requesting state, and not common criminals as in mod-
em international law. See L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, at 704. Commentators agree
that extradition "originated in early non-Western civilizations such as the Egyptian,
Chinese, Chaldean, and Assyro-Babylonian." M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 5.
11. M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 6; Blakesley, supra note 10, at 42.
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Egypt, frustrated an attempt by the Hittite King Hattusili III to
conquer Egypt.' 2 The defeat of the Hittites resulted in the for-
mation of a peace treaty with the Egyptians.' 3 This treaty con-
tained an express provision authorizing the exchange of each
sovereign's fugitives taking asylum within the other's domin-
ion. 14
Formal conventions served as the basic vehicle for extradi-
tion agreements in the Middle Ages.' 5 The treaties resulting
from these conventions essentially provided for the return of
political enemies to their respective sovereigns, although com-
mon criminals, to a much smaller extent, also fell under the
agreements.' 6 The ancient concept of rendition as a tyranni-
cally motivated device for vengeance of political wrongs
thrived in the Middle Ages. 17 Not until the Convention of
March 4, 1376, did an extradition agreement in the Middle
Ages expressly address non-political fugitives.' 8 The emphasis
12. THE COLUMBIA HISTORY OF THE WORLD 86 (J. Garraty & P. Gay eds. 1972)
[hereinafter COLUMBIA HISTORY]. The Columbia History describes Ramses II as
the last imperial ruler of Egypt. His fame reached Greek tradition and,
through it, English poetry. He is the Ozymandias of Shelley. He fathered
162 children during his reign of 67 years, raised the most colossal of colossi
(his statue at Abu Simbel is about 66 feet high), and covered the walls of his
enormous temples with vainglorious pictures and inscriptions. "Look on
my works, ye Mighty, and despair!" Today the tourists view his legless
statue, 34 feet long, lying in the sand near Cairo, and stare at his mummy in
the Cairo Museum. "Nothing beside remains."
Id.; see M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 6; Blakesley, supra note 10, at 42.
13. See M. BASsIoUNI, supra note 1, at 6.
14. See id. Ramses II had the treaty carved, in hieroglyphics, on the Temple of
Ammon at Karnak. Id. The document is also preserved on clay tablets in Akkodrain
in the Hittite archives of Boghazkoi, about 110 miles to the east of Ankara, the capital
of Turkey. See id.; see also COLUMBIA HISTORY, supra note 12, at 86.
15. See Blakesley, supra note 8, at 48.
16. See id. The Treaty of 1174 between England and Scotland, and the 1303
Treaty of Paris between England and France, provide examples of treaties requiring
the return of political fugitives. See id.
17. See id. at 49.
18. See id. at 48. Professor Blakesley describes the Convention of March 4, 1376,
between Charles V, King of France, and the Count of Savoy, as the
most similar to the modern conceptualization of extradition. It was the
most non-political convention of the time period. The Convention called
for the reciprocal rendition of "malefactors promptly upon the first request"
specifying that the perpetrators of common crimes would be delivered up.
The purpose of the Convention was to combat crimes and common
criminals in general more than to punish or persecute political enemies.
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of this Convention weighed more heavily on common
criminals than on political enemies, thus becoming analogous
to the purposes of modem extradition treaties.' 9
The 1376 Convention foreshadowed the extradition
agreements of the modem era.2 0 Until the middle of the eight-
eenth century, however, most extradition agreements re-
mained essentially political in purpose.2' Beginning in the
1700s the focus of extradition began to shift towards preserv-
ing the world public order.22 Still, the extradition treaties of
the eighteenth century did not relinquish the possibility of ren-
dition for political and military offenses.23 The treaties of the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries did, however,
create many of the rules and procedures followed in extradi-
tion law today.24
With the advent of the nineteenth century, extradition law
became predominantly concerned with the suppression of
common crime.25 Acting as a harbinger of this shift, the polit-
ical offense exception became commonplace in the extradition
treaties of that century. 26 Philosophies advocating penal re-
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 7. Constant threat of war between the
European nations in the Middle Ages betokened the futility of pursuing other treaties
for cooperation. See id. at 8. Extradition mandates cooperation between sovereigns.
See id. The absence of such cooperation during the Middle Ages led to little develop-
ment away from the limited concept of extradition as a tool for revenge on political
enemies. See id.
22. See id.
23. See Blakesley, supra note 10, at 51.
24. See I. SHEARER, supra note 1, at 18. The French extradition treaties of the
late 18th century and the early 19th century set forth many of the modem principles
of extradition law. See id. at 17. The 1834 treaty between France and Belgium, for
example, for the first time in history included provisions for the political offense ex-
ception and the non-extradition of nationals. See id. at 18. The treaties of this era
also established the requirements that requests for extradition come through diplo-
matic channels accompanied by an act of accusation, and the concept of reciprocity-
the giving of reciprocal effect to the procedures of the sovereigns with whom treaties
are maintained. See Blakesley, supra note 8, at 51; see also M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1,
at 321 (discussing reciprocity).
25. See M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 7.
26. See Blakesley, supra note 10, at 51. The political offense exception to extradi-
tion treaties denotes a class of
crimes which are incidental to and form a part of political disturbances; but
it might also be understood to include offenses consisting in an attack upon
the political order of things established in the country where committed,
and even to include offenses committed to obtain any political object.
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form occasioned these changes in extradition. 7 As the focus
of extradition began to center on common criminals, concern
for the protection of the relator's human rights under extradi-
tion treaties also developed .2  Thus, the procedural complexi-
ties of extradition today reflect concerns for human rights.29
B. The Doctrine of Speciality
The doctrine of speciality developed to protect the re-
quested country from abuse of its discretionary act of extradi-
tion.3 ' A violation of speciality occurs when, after extradition,
the requesting nation charges and prosecutes, or seeks to pros-
Under extradition treaties, [it] is an offense committed in the course of and
incidental to a violent political disturbance, such as war, revolution and re-
bellion; an offense is not of a political character simply because it was politi-
cally motivated.
BLAcK's LAw Dic'IONARY 158 (6th ed. 1990). Today, the United States includes the
political offense exception as standard language in extradition treaties. See, e.g., Ex-
tradition Treaty, supra note 3, art. 5, 31 U.S.T. at 5063-64, T.I.A.S. No. 9656; see
Blakesley, supra note 10, at 52 n.56.
27. M. BAssIouNi, supra note 1, at 8. The philosophers of the Age of Enlighten-
ment provided much of the impetus necessary for change. Id. Beccaria's On Crimes
and Punishment, published anonymously in 1764, challenged existing conceptions of
justice and inspired penal reform. COLUMBIA HISTORY, supra note 11, at 704. Bec-
caria's conclusions reflect the utilitarian ideals of modem criminal justice: "In order
that punishment not be invariably an act of violence committed by one or many
against a citizen, it must be essentially public, prompt, necessary, the least possible in
the given circumstances, proportionate to the crime, and in accordance with the law."
Id. (quoting Beccaria's On Crimes and Punishment).
28. See M. BAssIoUNI, supra note 1, at 8.
29. See id. at 8-9. Professor Bassiouni states that
[t]o a large extent, the processes and its participants have not changed much
in the course of time, but the rationale and purposes of the practice have, as
have the formal aspects of the proceedings. But the emergence of humani-
tarian international law has given rise to a new legal status to one of the
participants, i.e., the individual, thus placing some limitations on the power
of respective sovereigns that did not exist historically.
Id.
30. See M. BAsslouNI, supra note 1, at 360. Professor Bassiouni offers five factors
as the basis for the doctrine of speciality:
1. The requested state could have refused extradition if it knew that the
relator would be prosecuted or punished for an offense other than the
one for which extradition was granted.
2. The requesting state would not have in personam jurisdiction over the re-
lator, if not for the requested state's surrender of that person.
3. The requesting state could not have prosecuted the offender, other than
in absentia, nor could it punish him without securing that person's surren-
der from the requested state.
4. The requesting state would be abusing a formal process to secure the
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ecute, the relator for a crime not agreed to by the requested
nation in the extradition proceedings. 3 ' Implicitly, the doc-
trine provides the relator with assurances against unexpected
prosecution. 32
By the 1870s, international law had generally accepted the
validity of the doctrine of speciality." Many U.S. extradition
treaties, however, contained no speciality provisions because
their creation predated the principle's acceptance. 34 The ab-
sence of express provisions for the doctrine of speciality in
U.S. extradition treaties created a reluctance in many U.S.
courts to apply the principle.35 Thus, the domestic law of the
surrender of the person it seeks by relying on the requested state, which
will use its processes to effectuate the surrender.
5. The requested state would be using its processes in reliance upon the
representations made by the requesting state.
Id.
31. See id.
32. See id. An 1844 treaty between France and Luxembourg initiated the devel-
opment of the doctrine of speciality. See I. SHEARER, supra note 1, at 18. This treaty
provided that the relator could only stand trial for offenses specifically listed in the
extradition treaty and not for other offenses committed before extradition. See id.
Incorporation of the doctrine of speciality by the United States began with an 1868
treaty with Italy. 1J. MOORE, supra note 1, at 194. The 1868 treaty provided that the
relator "shall in no case be tried for any ordinary crime committed previously to that
for which his or their surrender is asked." United States-Italy Extradition Treaty,
reprinted in part at 1 J. MOORE, supra note 1, at 194.
33. See generally 1J. MOORE, supra note 1, at 194-96 (discussing incorporation of
speciality clauses into U.S. treaties).
34. See Harvard Research Project, supra note 1, at 213. The 1842 Ashburton Treaty
with Great Britain, for example, contained no speciality provision. See BIRON &
CHALMERS, THE LAw AND PRACTICE OF ExTADTrrIoN 30 (1981) (discussing judicial
incorporation of speciality into 1842 treaty); see also 1J. MOORE, supra note 1, at 196-
239 (discussing tension between United States and Great Britain resulting from ab-
sence of speciality provision in 1842 treaty).
35. See I J. MOORE, supra note 1, at 196-239. In United States v. Caldwell, the Cir-
cuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York denied the
existence of the doctrine of speciality in criminal prosecutions. United States v. Cald-
well, 8 Blatchf. 131 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1871). Mr. Caldwell was extradited from Canada
under the Ashburton Treaty of 1842 on charges of forgery. Id. at 132. He protested
his trial on charges of bribery. Id. Notwithstanding deceit in the extradition process,
the court noted that
while abuse of extradition proceedings, and want of good faith in resorting
to them, doubtless constitute a good cause of complaint between the two
Governments, such complaints do not form a proper subject of investigation
in the Courts, however much those tribunals might regret that they should
have been permitted to arise. To hold otherwise, would, in a case like the
present, permit a person accused of crime to put the Government on trial
for its dealings with a foreign power.
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United States did not uniformly recognize the doctrine.36 This
failure to adopt the doctrine of speciality eventually created se-
vere diplomatic tensions between Great Britain and the United
States. 7 Great Britain maintained that trial of the relator on
unextradited charges breached the requesting country's treaty
obligations.3 8 The United States, however, took the position
that no such obligation existed absent an express provision in
the treaty.3 9 These tensions culminated with a six month pe-
riod in 1876 when neither Great Britain nor the United States
made any requisitions, thereby resulting in the escape of many
Id. at 133; see 1J. MOORE, supra note 1, at 220. Three years later, the New York Court
of Appeals, in Adriance v. Lagrave, similarly held that the doctrine of speciality had no
application to criminal proceedings. Adriance v. Lagrave, 59 N.Y. 110 (1874); see
infra note 37 (discussing other U.S. cases involving doctrine of speciality).
36. See 1 J. MOORE, supra note 1, at 219-33 (discussing various approaches of
U.S. courts to speciality).
37. See id. at 196-219. The diplomatic tension between the United States and
Great Britain arose in part from the case of Lawrence. In February 1875, Charles
Lawrence was indicted in New York on charges of forgery, conspiracy, and smug-
gling. Id. at 203. Subsequently, he fled to England. Id. at 202. In April 1875, Great
Britain extradited Mr. Lawrence to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York on charges of "forging and uttering a certain bond and affidavit." Id.
Once in New York, however, it became apparent that the government intended to try
Mr. Lawrence for the unextradited charges of conspiracy and smuggling. Id. at 203.
Mr. Lawrence claimed immunity from prosecution on charges not included in the
extradition agreement. Id. at 204. The United States, through the Solicitor-Ceneral,
took the position that no law or treaty prevented the trial of Mr. Lawrence on the
unextradited offenses. Id.
In November 1875, Lord Derby, Great Britain's Foreign Secretary, instructed
the British Minister at Washington to protest formally if the U.S. government at-
tempted to try Lawrence on the unextradited charges. Id. at 205. U.S. Secretary of
State Fish responded that while the government had the right to try Mr. Lawrence for
unextradited crimes, prosecution would proceed first on the extradited charges. Id.
at 206. A decision as to further prosecution on the unextradited charges hinged
upon the outcome of the first prosecution. Id. As a result, the government brought a
new indictment against Mr. Lawrence that included only those offenses listed in the
extradition agreement. Id. at 207.
This did little to placate the British government. Id. In late February of 1876,
the United States requested the extradition of Ezra Winslow on charges of forgery
and utterance of forged paper. Id. at 196. The British government denied this re-
quest absent an agreement limiting Mr. Winslow's trial to the extradited offenses. Id.
at 200.
38. Id. at 200-01. Lord Derby took the position that a proper construction of
the treaty imposed this obligation on the parties to the treaty. Id.
39. Id. at 199. Secretary Fish took the position that Great Britain had no right to
impose conditions on extradition other than those expressly provided for in the
treaty. Id.
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criminals .0
The diplomatic polemic over speciality between Great
Britain and the United States provoked great debate among
U.S. and British legal scholars.4' The preponderance of schol-
arly authority supported the position taken by Great Britain.42
As a result, a number of U.S. courts began to adopt the views
of Great Britain in their rulings. 43 Although some courts con-
tinued to consider whether, absent an express treaty provision,
speciality constrained prosecutions in the U.S. courts,44 other
courts concerned themselves with the question of individual
rights under the doctrine. 5
40. Id. at 210-11. In October 1876, Great Britain abandoned its demands, stat-
ing that
Her Majesty's Government, having regard to the very serious inconvenience
and great encouragement to crime which would arise from the continued
suspension of the extradition of criminals between the British dominions
and the United States, will be prepared, as a temporary measure, until a new
extradition treaty can be concluded, to put in force all powers vested in it for
the surrender of accused persons to the Government of the United States
under the treaty of 1842, without asking for any engagement as to such per-
sons not being tried in the United States for other than the offenses for
which extradition has been demanded.
Id. at 210-11. The United States accepted Great Britain's new position and again
requested the extradition of Mr. Winslow. Id. at 211. By this time, however, Mr.
Winslow had escaped, and as a result, his extradition was never completed. Id.
41. See id. at 212-19. Assistant U.S. Secretary of State Moore presented the
opinions of authorities regarding the Winslow controversy and concluded that "there
is an almost uniform concurrence in the opinion that a person surrendered for one
offence should not be tried for another ...... Id. at 217-18; see United States v.
Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 416-17 (1886) (discussing legal authorities).
42. See 1 J. MOORE, supra note 1, at 212-19 (discussing opinions of authorities).
43. E.g., United States v. Watts, 14 F. 130 (S.D. Cal. 1882); see IJ. MOORE, supra
note 1, at 222-33 (discussing cases after Winslow controversy).
44. In re Miller, 23 F. 32 (W.D. Pa. 1885). In re Miller involved an escaped con-
vict returned to the United States from Canada on charges fabricated to secure his
return. Id. at 33. The court reviewed existing authority on the subject and deter-
mined that the question of whether speciality applied absent an express treaty provi-
sion was still open. Id. The court went on to hold, however, that a defendant could
not acquire a right to contend his previous convictions by fleeing to a foreign juris-
diction. Id. at 34; see 1 J. MOORE, supra note 1, at 230.
45. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hawes, 13 Bush 697 (Kent. 1877) (holding that
speciality protects international agreement and not personal rights of accused); see
State v. Vanderpool, 39 Ohio St. 273 (1885) (stating that "[i]f, as we hold, the ques-
tion is one of personal right under the treaty, as well as international law, it follows
that the courts can hear and determine such right when it is invaded").
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1. United States v. Rauscher
The U.S. Supreme Court first addressed the doctrine of
speciality in the landmark case of United States v. Rauscher.46
Mr. Rauscher, the second mate of a U.S. ship, murdered a crew
member while at sea.47 Subsequently Mr. Rauscher fled to
Great Britain. 48 At the request of the United States, Great
Britain apprehended and extradited Mr. Rauscher to the Cir-
cuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of
New York on the charge of murder. 49 Pursuant to an indict-
ment a jury convicted Mr. Rauscher for inflicting cruel and un-
usual punishment, and not the charge of murder for which
Great Britain had extradited him.5 °
Mr. Rauscher argued that his conviction on the charge of
cruel and unusual punishment constituted a violation of the
extradition treaty because the extradition agreement charged
him only with murder.5' The judges sitting in the circuit court
differed in opinion as to the proper resolution of the conflict
and thus referred the matter to the U.S. Supreme Court.5 2
46. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
47. Id. at 409. The incident occurred in the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
of the United States, thereby vesting subject matter jurisdiction in the U.S. courts.
Id. While the speciality doctrine may appear to limit the subject matter jurisdiction of
the United States, because it bars the trial of the defendants on some charges, it is
actually a restraint on the personal jurisdiction of the extradited individual. See
United States v. Vreeken, 803 F.2d 1085, 1088 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1067 (1987); infra notes 183-90 and accompanying text (discussing Vreeken and per-
sonal jurisdiction); infra notes 221-27 and accompanying text (analyzing Vreekenjuris-
dictional argument).
48. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 409.
49. Id.
50. See id. Mr. Rauscher was convicted under section 5347 of the Revised Stat-
utes of the United States. Id. The statute, entitled "Maltreatment of crew by officers
of vessels" provides that
[e]very master or other officer of any American vessel on the high seas, or
on any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the
United States, who, from malice, hatred, or revenge, and without justifiable
cause, beats, wounds, or imprisons any of the crew of such vessel, or with-
holds from them suitable food and nourishment, or inflicts upon them any
cruel and unusual punishment, shall be punished by a fine of not more than
one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not more than five years, or by
both.
Rev. Stat. § 5347, reprinted at 18 Stat. 1039 (1878) (repealed).
51. See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886); see also 1 J. MOORE, supra
note 1, at 234.
52. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 409. The judges of the circuit court certified four ques-
tions to the Court:
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The Court prefaced 'its analysis by noting that while a
treaty is contractual by nature, it is also "the supreme law of
the land" under article VI of the U.S. Constitution.53 Follow-
ing this reasoning, the Court equated treaties with legislative
acts. 54 The Court then found that when treaty provisions af-
First. The prisoner having been extradited upon a charge of murder
... had the Circuit Court... jurisdiction to put him to trial upon an indict-
ment... charging him with cruel and unusual punishment ... [when] such
punishment consist[s] of the identical acts proved in the extradition pro-
ceedings?
Second. Did or not the prisoner, under the extradition treaty with
Great Britain, having been surrendered upon a charge of murder, acquire a
right to be exempt from prosecution upon the charge set forth in the indict-
ment, without being first afforded an opportunity to return to Great Britain?
Third. Was it error on the part of the trial judge to overrule a plea to
the jurisdiction of the court to try the indictment ... charging the accused
with cruel and unusual punishment.., it having been established upon said
plea that the accused was extradited under the extradition treaty with Great
Britain, upon the charge of murder... ?
Fourth. Was it error on the part of the trial judge to refuse to direct a
verdict of acquittal, after it had been proven that the accused was extradited
under the extradition treaty with Great Britain, upon the charge of murder,
it also appearing that in the proceedings preliminary to the warrant of extra-
dition the same act was investigated, and the same witnesses examined, as at
the trial?
Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 409-10 (emphasis added). Rauscher presented the Court with
two general problems. First, the Court had to determine whether the doctrine of
speciality should bind U.S. courts when the treaty contains no express speciality pro-
vision. See id. Second, the Court had to determine the remedy that would correct a
violation of the doctrine of speciality. See id.
53. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 418-19. Article VI of the U.S. Constitution provides
that
[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Con-
stitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
54. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 418-19. Extradition treaties require no implementing
legislation to become effective, thereby making them self-executing. See M. BAS-
SIOUNI, supra note 1, at 74. Self-executing treaties bind the judiciary with the obliga-
tion to enforce them as they would the U.S. Constitution or a federal statute. Id.
Executory. treaties, on the other hand, require implementing legislation in order to
become effective. Id. The terms of executory treaties convey obligations that need
legislative execution before enforcement by the courts is possible. Id.
Although the judiciary does not require the authority of Congress to adjudicate
extradition proceedings, Congress has passed several extradition statutes which seek
to regulate and assist the judiciary in such proceedings. Id. at 39-42. Congress
passed the first extradition statute in 1848. See id. at 41-42. The 1848 act underwent
ten amendments over the course of the next 135 years. See id. at 42. In 1984, the
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fect the rights of individuals, courts have the power to enforce
and uphold those rights.5
Exploring the nature of extradition, the Court next found
that the intent behind extradition treaties reflects the principle
of speciality.56 The Court equated a violation of this principle
with a violation of the relator's rights under the treaty.57 Thus,
1981-1984 Extradition Act was enacted. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-3195 (1988). This
legislation has been criticized as falling short of its potential because it leaves many
issues for the judiciary to decide. M. BAssIouNI, supra note 1, at 52. For example, the
U.S. Congress has provided the courts with no statutory guidance concerning the
right of relators to claim the protection of the doctrine of speciality. Id.
Additionally, when the provisions of an extradition treaty conflict with federal
legislation, the one that was adopted later in time prevails. See Head Money Cases,
112 U.S. 580 (1884). The U.S. Supreme Court stated that "so far as a treaty made by
the United States with any foreign nation can become the subject of judicial cogni-
zance in the courts of this country, it is subject to such acts as Congress may pass for
its enforcement, modification or repeal." Id. at 599; see M. BAssIOUNI, supra note 1, at
75.
55. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 418-19. The Court relied on its decision in the Head
Money Cases to distinguish the effect of treaties as the law of the land from their con-
tractual aspects. Id.; see Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598-99. According to the
Court, central to this distinction is the fact that
a treaty may also contain provisions which confer certain rights upon the
citizens or subjects of one of the nations residing in the territorial limits of
the other, which partake of the nature of municipal law, and which are capa-
ble of enforcement as between private parties in the courts of the country
.... A treaty, then, is a law of the land, as an act of Congress is, whenever its
provisions prescribe a rule by which the rights of the private citizen or sub-
ject may be determined. And when such rights are of a nature to be en-
forced in a court ofjustice, that court resorts to the treaty for a rule of deci-
sion for the case before it as it would to a statute.
Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 418-19; see Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598-99.
56. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 420 (1886). The Court found it
very clear that this treaty did not intend to depart ... from the recognized
public law which had prevailed in the absence of treaties, and that it was not
intended that this treaty should be used for any other purpose than to se-
cure the trial of the person extradited for one of the offenses enumerated in
the treaty. This is not only apparent from the general principle that the
specific enumeration of certain matters and things implies the exclusion of
all others, but the entire face of the treaty, including the process by which it
is carried into effect, confirms this view of the subject.
Id.
57. Id. at 420. The Court stated that
as this right of transfer, the right to demand it, the obligation to grant it, the
proceedings under which it takes place, all show that it is for a limited and
defined purpose that the transfer is made, it is impossible to conceive of the
exercise ofjurisdiction in such a case for any other purpose than that men-
tioned in the treaty, and ascertained by the proceedings under which the
party is extradited, without an implication offraud upon the rights of the party extra-
dited, and of bad faith to the country which permitted his extradition.
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the Court held that Mr. Rauscher had acquired a right to ex-
emption from trial upon charges not listed in the extradition
agreement without the opportunity of first returning to Great
Britain.5" The Supreme Court remedied the violation of the
speciality doctrine by stripping the trial court of personal juris-
diction over Mr. Rauscher to try him for the unextradited
charge of cruel and unusual punishment.5 9
2. Application of the Rauscher Principle
The U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Rauscher repeatedly
referred to the rights conferred upon the defendant by the ex-
tradition treaty.60 The Court reiterated this position in Ker v.
Illinois,6 decided on the same day as Rauscher. In Ker, a private
detective kidnapped the defendant in Peru and forced him to
return to the United States for trial. 62 The defendant pro-
tested the trial court's exercise of personal jurisdiction as a vio-
lation of the extradition treaty.63 The defendant argued that
the existence of an extradition treaty between Peru and the
United States prohibited rendition by abduction.'
The Ker Court distinguished Rauscher, noting that the ex-
tradition proceedings through which Mr. Rauscher had come
to the United States provided him with a right to face prosecu-
tion for only those charges listed in the extradition agree-
ment.65 The Ker Court held that the defendant, unlike Mr.
Id. at 422 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 424. Referring to the right conferred upon Mr. Rauscher by the doc-
trine of speciality, the Court stated that
[t]hat right, as we understand it, is that he shall be tried only for the offence
with which he is charged in the extradition proceedings and for which he
was delivered up, and that if not tried for that, or after trial and acquittal, he
shall have a reasonable time to leave the country before he is arrested upon
the charge of any other crime committed previous to his extradition.
Id.
59. Id. at 433. The Court also pointed out, however, that the trial court had
subject matter jurisdiction over the case. Id.
60. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886); see supra notes 46-59 and
accompanying text (discussing Rauscher); infra notes 206-20 and accompanying text
(analyzing Rauscher).
61. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
62. Id. at 438-39.
63. Id. at 439.
64. Id. at 441.
65. Id. at 443. Discussing Rauscher, the Court in Ker stated that "[o]ne of the
rights with which he was thus clothed, both in regard to himself and in good faith to the
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Rauscher, had no right to protest a violation of the extradition
treaty because he did not come to this country clothed with the
protection of an extradition treaty. 6
Rauscher incorporated into U.S. law the international legal
doctrine that binds U.S. courts to recognize the applicability of
the doctrine of speciality to all U.S. extradition treaties.
Eventually the United States routinely began to incorporate
the doctrine into the terms of all extradition treaties.68 Many
U.S. courts, however, have had difficulty applying the doctrine
to protect the rights of relators.6 9
II. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE DOCTRINE OF
SPECIALITY
An analysis of individual rights under the doctrine of spe-
ciality involves two seemingly intertwined issues. The first is-
sue concerns to whom the right of speciality belongs. 7' The
second issue, whether the defendant has standing7' to raise ob-
jections to violations of the doctrine of speciality, exists as an
country which had sent him here, was, that he should be tried for no other offence
than the one for which he was delivered under the extradition proceedings." Id.
(emphasis added).
66. Id. The Court stated "[w]e think it very clear, therefore, that, in invoking the
jurisdiction of this court upon the ground that the prisoner was denied a right con-
ferred upon him by a treaty of the United States, he has failed to establish the exist-
ence of any such right." Id.
67. See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886); see also United States v.
Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289, 1297 (3d Cir. 1991) (discussing Rauscher).
68. See, e.g., Extradition Treaty, supra note 2, 31 U.S.T. 5059, T.I.A.S. No. 9656,
(citing speciality provision of United States-Mexico extradition treaty); see Extradition
Treaty, June 20, 1978, United States-Germany, 32 U.S.T. 1485, T.I.A.S. No. 9785;
Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, United States-United Kingdom, 28 U.S.T. 227,
T.I.A.S. No. 8468.
69. See infra notes 70-200 and accompanying text (discussing treatment of speci-
ality and individual rights by U.S. courts).
70. See infra notes 75-152 (discussing courts denying individual rights under
doctrine of speciality); infra notes 153-200 (discussing courts granting individual
rights under doctrine of speciality).
71. Standing is "the legal right of a person or group to challenge in a judicial
forum the conduct of another, especially with respect to governmental conduct."
BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 451 (1984). The Supreme Court stated that the issue of
standing concerns whether the party seeking relief has "alleged such a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illu-
mination of difficult constitutional questions." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204
(1962).
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extrapolation of the first issue.72
The U.S. courts finding that defendants do not have rights
under the doctrine view speciality as a right of the requested
country, and, therefore, not as ajusticiable issue absent a pro-
test from the requested country.7" Other courts, however,
hold that individuals may invoke the doctrine of speciality re-
gardless of whether the requested country protests. 4
A. Courts Granting Relators No Rights Under Doctrine Of Speciality
Most U.S. courts agree that the doctrine of speciality pro-
tects the requested country from abuse of its discretionary de-
cision to grant an extradition.7 5 The fact that treaties impose
contractual obligations on the signatory nations underlies this
conclusion.76 Some U.S. courts, however, adhere to the tradi-
tional view of treaties which provides that only parties to the
treaty may invoke treaty protections like the doctrine of speci-
ality. 77 Under this view, only nations receive the protection of
the doctrine of speciality, because only nations make treaties. 8
72. See infra notes 129-52 and accompanying text (discussing doctrine of special-
ity and standing). It should be noted that courts which grant rights to individuals
under the doctrine of speciality have no need to reach the issue of whether the de-
fendant has standing to raise objections to its violation.
73. See infra notes 75-128 and accompanying text (discussing courts denying in-
dividual rights under doctrine of speciality); infra notes 129-52 and accompanying
text (discussing courts questioning or denying relator's standing to raise violations of
doctrine of speciality).
74. See infra notes 153-200 and accompanying text (discussing courts recogniz-
ing speciality as right of individuals).
75. E.g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 906 (2d Cir.) (stating "principle of
specialty [sic] has been viewed as a privilege of the asylum state"), cert. dismissed, 414
U.S. 884 (1973); see M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 360-61. Professor Bassiouni states
that the doctrine of speciality "is principally advanced as a means of protecting the
requested state from abuse of its processes." Id. at 360.
76. See M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 9 n.12 (discussing contractual nature of
extradition treaties); see also Note, supra note 1, at 310 (discussing contractual nature
of extradition treaties).
77. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Donnelly v. Mulligan, 76 F.2d 511 (2d Cir.
1935). The court stated that "[e]xtradition treaties are for the benefit of the con-
tracting parties and are a means of providing for their social security and protection
against criminal acts, and it is for this reason that rights of asylum and immunity
belong to the state of refuge and not to the criminal." Id. at 513; see M. BASSIOUNI,
INTERNArIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 562 (1974).
78. See Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 906 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414
U.S. 884 (1973); Fiocconi v. Attorney General of the United States, 462 F.2d 475,
479-80 n.8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972); United States v. Paroutian,
299 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1962).
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Thus, any protection that the individual receives from the doc-
trine applies derivatively, not commensurately. 79 This ration-
ale also supports a number of cases that find standing to pro-
test a violation of the doctrine of speciality belongs only to the
requested country.80
1. Test Applied By Some Courts To Determine Violations of
the Doctrine of Speciality
Some U.S. courts have developed a test for determining
whether a violation of speciality exists.8 ' This test examines
whether the requested country would protest the trial of the
relator on the charges in question as a violation of the doctrine
of speciality.82 Such an inquiry, however, by failing to ac-
knowledge the role of the relator in the extradition proceed-
ings, creates an implication that the relator has no treaty
rights.8 3
In United States v. Paroutian,s4 one of the first modem deci-
sions in this area, the United States indicted the defendant on
charges of narcotics trafficking in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York. 5 Subsequently, Lebanon
79. See United States v. Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289 (3d Cir.) (holding that because
requested country consented to waiver of doctrine of speciality defendant could not
avoid prosecution by asserting treaty rights); see also United States v. Diwan, 864 F.2d
715, 721 (1 th Cir.) (asserting that relator's right to raise violations of speciality is
derivative of nation's right), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 921 (1989).
80. E.g., United States v. Kaufman, 874 F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1989); see infra notes
129-52 and accompanying text (discussing courts denying individual standing to pro-
test violations of speciality).
81. See infra notes 84-112 and accompanying text (discussing courts applying
this test).
82. See United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486, 490-91 (2d Cir. 1962).
83. See Greene v. United States, 154 F. 401 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 207 U.S. 596
(1907). In Greene, Canada extradited the defendants to the United States for trial on
charges of fraud and embezzlement. Id. at 403. The defendants claimed that the
charges for which Canada granted their extradition were not the charges listed in the
indictment, and that therefore the court had no authority to subject them to trial on
those charges. Id. at 403-04. The court found that it could determine whether a
violation of the doctrine of speciality had occurred by "considering the demand that
had been made on that government and the evidence that was submitted to it by the
United States to sustain such demand." Id. at 404.
84. 299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962).
85. Id. at 491. The indictment charged Paroutian for conspiring to import, re-
ceive, conceal, sell, and facilitate the transportation of heroin in the United States in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 174. Paroutian, 299 F.2d at 487.
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extradited the defendant to the United States. 6 The trial of
Paroutian did not proceed pursuant to the indictment issued
by the Southern District.17 It proceeded under a later indict-
ment from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
New York, which included counts not listed in the original in-
dictment.8 8 On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial on
the additional counts not listed in the extradition agreement
violated the doctrine of speciality as established in United States
v. Rauscher.89
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that the doctrine of speciality protects the requested govern-
ment.90 With this in mind, the court established a test for de-
termining what constitutes a violation of the doctrine of speci-
ality.9 ' By deciding whether the requested country would con-
sider the offense as tried separately from the extradited
offenses, the court reasoned, it could ascertain whether a viola-
tion of the doctrine of speciality existed.92 The Paroutian court
concluded that no violation of the doctrine of speciality had
occurred because it believed that Lebanon would not have
considered the additional charges as separate from those for
which he was extradited.93
The Second Circuit, in Paroutian, did not address the issue
of whether the defendant had a right to object to a violation of
the doctrine of speciality.94 The court only examined whether
Lebanon would have considered the trial a violation of the ex-
tradition agreement. 95 By providing that the right to deter-
mine a violation of speciality belongs to the requested country,
86. Paroutian, 299 F.2d at 487.
87. Id. at 490.
88. Id. The indictment from the Eastern District included the two additional
counts of receiving and concealing heroin. Id.
89. Id. at 490-91.
90. Id. at 490. The court stated that speciality is "designed to protect the extra-
diting government against abuse of its discretionary act of extradition." Id.
91. Id. at 490-91.
92. Id. at 491. The court stated that "the test whether trial is for a 'separate
offense' should not be some technical refinement of local law, but whether the extra-
diting country would consider the offense actually tried 'separate'." Id. at 490-91.
93. Id. at 491. The court was unconvinced "that the Lebanese, fully apprised of
the facts as they were, would consider that Paroutian was tried for anything else but
the offense for which he was extradited." Id.
94. See generally id.
95. Id.
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this test appears to reduce the rights of the individual under
the treaty.96
Ten years after Paroutian, the Second Circuit again ad-
dressed the issue of speciality in Fiocconi v. Attorney General of the
United States.97 In Fiocconi, an indictment from the U.S. District
Court for the District of Massachusetts charged the defendants
with conspiring to import heroin into the United States.98 Ital-
ian authorities arrested the defendants and, subsequently, the
United States requested their extradition.99 Italy granted the
extradition as an act of comity because the extradition treaty
between Italy and the United States did not recognize narcot-
ics crimes as extraditable.'
The defendants pled not guilty to the Massachusetts in-
dictment.'' After their release on bail, a grand jury subpoe-
naed the defendants to appear in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York.'0 2 Upon arrival in New
York, the defendants were arrested pursuant to an indictment
returned that day charging them with substantive narcotics
crimes.' 0 3 Subsequently, the grand jury returned a supersed-
ing indictment, charging the defendants with conspiracy to vio-
96. See infra note 112 (discussing restrictive view of speciality).
97. 462 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972).
98. Id. at 476.
99. Id. After the issuance of U.S. bench warrants for the arrest of the defend-
ants, Interpol traced them to Italy, where they were apprehended. Id.
100. Id. at 476-77. Comity is the recognition by one sovereignty of the laws of
another sovereignty out of deference and respect. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 267 (6th
ed. 1990). In international law the theory of comity attempts to balance a country's
international obligation with the rights of those enjoying the protection of its laws.
Id. If the government of one country feels that the rights of a citizen are jeopardized
by a request for comity they may disregard the international obligation by not recog-
nizing the other country's law. See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 419
(1886). Extradition treaties attempt to contractualize comity. See id. at 418. The
doctrine of speciality provides assurances that indiscriminate prosecution will not re-
sult if extradition is granted. Id. at 419-20. This insures the rights of individuals
under the extradition treaty to the protection they would be accorded under the laws
of the country from which they were taken. Id.
101. Fiocconi v. Attorney General of the United States, 462 F.2d 475, 477 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972).
102. Id.
103. Id. The new indictment in the Southern District of New York charged the
defendants with "the substantive crime of receiving, concealing, selling and facilitat-
ing the transportation, concealment and sale of 37 kilograms of heroin." Id.
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late narcotics laws.' 04 The defendants argued that their deten-
tion on a charge other than that for which the Italian govern-
ment rendered them violated the doctrine of speciality.' 05
Interpreting Rauscher, the Second Circuit first concluded
that the principle of speciality governs extraditions granted as
an act of comity.' 0 6 The court then applied the test developed
in Paroutian,°7 taking it a step further by assuming that Italy
would have protested had they not consented to the trial of
defendants on the additional charges. 10 8 Upon a finding that
Italy had not protested, the court held that no violation of the
principle of speciality had occurred. 0 9
The court's holding in Fiocconi, that a relator may only
gain the protection of the doctrine of speciality if the requested
country protests, does not deny the defendant the right to
104. Id. This indictment charged the defendants "with conspiring to violate
narcotics laws from January 1, 1970 through January 4, 1972." Id.
105. Id. The trial court had rejected this argument and the Second Circuit an-
nounced its affirmation from the bench. Id. The subsequent trial resulted in convic-
tion of the defendants. Id. The Second Circuit's opinion followed the conviction. Id.
106. Id. at 479; see supra note 100 (discussing comity). The Fiocconi court based
this determination on the fact that the Rauscher Court initially considered extraditions
absent the existence of a treaty. Fiocconi v. Attorney General of the United States,
462 F.2d 475, 479 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972); see United States v.
Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 419 (1886). In Rauscher, the Supreme Court concluded that
it can hardly be supposed that a government which was under no treaty ob-
ligation... to seize a person who had found an asylum within its bosom and
turn him over to another country for trial, would be willing to do this, unless
a case was made of some specific offence of a character which justified the
government in depriving the party of his asylum. It is unreasonable that the
country of the asylum should be expected to deliver up such person to be
dealt with by the demanding government without any limitation, implied or
otherwise, upon its prosecution of the party.
Id., quoted in Fiocconi v. Attorney General of United States, 462 F.2d 475, 479 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972).
107. Fiocconi, 462 F.2d at 481; see supra notes 84-96 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing test in Paroutian).
108. Fiocconi, 462 F.2d at 481.
109. Id. The court stated that "in the absence of any affirmative protest from
Italy, we do not believe that Government would regard the prosecution of [the de-
fendants] for subsequent offenses of the same character as the crime for which they
were extradited as a breach of faith by the United States." Id. It appears that the
court based this expansion of Paroutian on the fact that Italy knew of the additional
charges and did not respond. Id. at 477. Subsequent courts, however, have relied on
this test absent notification to the requested country. See, e.g., United States v. Kauf-
man, 858 F.2d 994, 1008 (1988), reh'g denied, 874 F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1989); see infra
note 146 and accompanying text (discussing application of test in other courts).
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raise the issue."l 0 It does, however, effectively preclude any
remedy to the defendant for a violation of the doctrine unless
the requested country views the subsequent proceedings as a
violation and protests."' While this test adequately serves to
protect the interests of the requested country, the rationale
supporting it undermines the rights of the relator." l2
2. Courts Holding that Speciality is Not a Right of the
Accused
Some U.S. courts conclude that the underlying wrong re-
sulting from a violation of speciality harms only the requested
country.' 13  These courts rely on a theory in international law
that extradition treaties only protect the requested country.' I"
The tests developed in Paroutian and Fiocconi evidence this po-
110. Fiocconi, 462 F.2d at 479-80 n.8. The court stated that
the rule of domestic law conferring a judicial remedy on the extraditee can
be a rule according him the remedy only if the surrendering government
would object, since the underlying substantive wrong, which grows out of
international law, is only to the latter.
Id.
111. Id.
112. See M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 364, stating that the
restrictive view of the rule of specialty [taken by the court in Fiocconi] fails to
take into account the relator as a participant in the extradition process and
his right to uphold such a doctrine when a demanding state acts at variance
with such obligations, regardless of whether or not the surrendering state
protests such actions.
Id.; see United States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In Sensi, the defendant
contested his extradition from Great Britain to the United States on eighteen charges
of theft as a violation of the doctrine of speciality. Id. at 895. The defendant argued
that because his trial proceeded on charges not listed before the extraditing magis-
trate the district court should have dismissed the indictment as a violation of the
doctrine of speciality. Id. The court, however, adopted the standard set forth in Re-
statement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States regarding the appli-
cability of the doctrine of speciality and found that no violation of speciality occurred.
Id.; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
§ 477 [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
The Restatement (Third) standard echoes the test developed in Paroutian and
Fiocconi. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra, § 477 with Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486 (2d
Cir. 1962), and Fiocconi, 462 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972).
The Restatement (Third) states that the applicable standard for determining a viola-
tion of the doctrine of speciality entails a finding as to "whether the requested state
has objected or would object to the prosecution." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra,
§ 477.
113. See Fiocconi, 462 F.2d at 479-80 n.8.
114. See id.; see also United States ex. rel. Donnelly v. Mulligan, 76 F.2d 511, 513
(2d Cir. 1935) (holding that extradition treaties only benefit contracting parties).
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sition." 5 Legal authorities and subsequent cases, however,
have challenged this theory, arguing that the relator maintains
certain rights under extradition treaties.1 6 Nonetheless, many
courts hold that extradition treaties extend no rights to the re-
lator. ' ' 7
Although the approach to the doctrine of speciality taken
by courts reviewing extradition requests differs from that of
courts examining whether the United States may have violated
the doctrine, the theory they expound remains the same." 18 In
115. See United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486, 490-91 (2d Cir. 1962); Fioc-
coni, 462 F.2d at 480-81; supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text (discussing Parou-
tian test); supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text (discussing Fiocconi test).
116. See United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir.) (allowing de-
fendant to raise objections to violations of speciality), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1009
(1986); M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 364; Kester, supra note 1, at 1465-68; Note,
supra note 1, at 310; infra notes 153-200 and accompanying text (discussing cases
granting relator right to raise violations of speciality).
117. E.g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 906 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414
U.S. 884 (1973); see infra notes 118-51 and accompanying text (discussing courts de-
nying individual rights under speciality).
118. The Supreme Court's decision in Rauscher adopted the doctrine of special-
ity as domestic law, thereby binding U.S. courts to try individuals for only those
crimes listed in the extradition agreement. See Rauscher, 119 U.S 407 (1886); see also
Shapiro, 478 F.2d at 905. The Shapiro court stated that Rauscher "established the rule
of domestic law that the courts of this country will not try a defendant extradited
from another country on the basis of a treaty obligation for a crime not listed in the
treaty." Id. This law, therefore, only applies to cases where the United States is the
requesting country. Id. at 906. A number of reasons make it impracticable to apply
the same standards in cases where the U.S. acts as the requested country. First, the
power to extradite an individual from the United States belongs to the executive,
rather than the judicial branch of the government. See id. In such a situation, the
only role that the courts play concerns an initial determination as to the ex-
traditability of particular offenses. See id. The U.S. Secretary of State makes the ulti-
mate decision regarding the charges for which the United States will commit the indi-
vidual to extradition. See id. Usually, the Secretary of State will pay heed to the find-
ings of the extraditing magistrate as to the extraditable offenses. See id. The
Secretary of State, however, has the duty of protesting if the requesting country vio-
lates the limitations to trial imposed on the extradition by the United States through
the extradition agreement. See id.
Second, the doctrine of speciality becomes violated only after the trial or punish-
ment of the individual for unextradited charges. See M. BAssIOUNI, supra note 1, at
360-61. Before an extradition occurs, no technical violation of speciality can occur
because, in most cases, the defendant has not undergone trial. See id. Thus, extradit-
ing magistrates review extradition requests for compliance with the treaty and U.S.
law. Shapiro, 478 F.2d at 906. A determination by a court before extradition con-
cerning whether a violation of speciality will occur, therefore, entails a prospective
rather than retrospective analysis. See generally M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 360-6 1.
Accordingly, the standards applied by the courts in cases where the United States
acts as the requested nation differ inherently from the tests necessary to determine
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Shapiro v. Ferrandina,"9 the defendant contested his pending
extradition to Israel as a violation of the doctrine of special-
ity. 120 The defendant argued that the extradition treaty be-
tween the United States and Israel did not include many of the
charges for which Israel sought extradition.12 ' The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that under interna-
tional law, the principle of speciality does not accrue to the
accused, but exists only for the protection of the requested
country. '
22
Notwithstanding the courts' interpretation of international
law on the subject of to whom the principle of speciality ap-
plies, the court reviewed Israel's extradition request to insure
the extraditability of the charged offenses. 123 The court there-
fore implicitly assumed that the defendant had the right to ob-
ject to a potential violation of the doctrine of speciality.' 24 By
finding that the design of speciality protects only the requested
country, and not the accused, however, the court provided the
impetus for future courts to deny the individual standing to
invoke the doctrine.12 5
whether the United States has breached the doctrine of speciality as the requesting
nation. See Shapiro, 478 F.2d at 905-06. The theory underlying the application of the
doctrine of speciality by courts, however, remains the same regardless of whether the
United States is the requested or requesting country. See id.; see also Berenguer v.
Vance, 473 F. Supp. 1195 (D.D.C. 1979); see infra note 127 (discussing speciality and
extraditability of charged offenses).
119. 478 F.2d 894 (2d. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884 (1973).
120. Id. at 905.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 906. The court stated that "[a]s a matter of international law, the
principle of specialty has been viewed as a privilege of the asylum state, designed to
protect its dignity and interests, rather than a right accruing to the accused." Id.; see 1
L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, at 702.
123. Shapiro, 478 F.2d at 909.
124. See generally Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414
U.S. 884 (1973).
125. See infra notes 129-52 and accompanying text (discussing courts that ques-
tion or deny relator's standing to invoke protection of doctrine of speciality). Re-
cently, in United States v. Caro-Quintero, the U.S. District Court for the Central District
of California held that defendants have no right to raise a violation of an extradition
treaty. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599 (C.D. Cal. 1990). In Caro-
Quintero, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents arranged for the abduction
of one of the defendants, Dr. Humberto Alvarez Machain, from Mexico. Id. at 603.
The court divested itself of jurisdiction on the grounds that the abduction violated
the extradition treaty. See id. at 601. The district court addressed the issue of defend-
ant's standing to raise the doctrine of speciality. Id. at 607. The court concisely
noted the split in the circuits concerning a defendant's right to raise the issue. Id. at
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Taken together, the Second Circuit's rulings in Paroutian,
Fiocconi, and Shapiro stand for the proposition that the doctrine
of speciality protects only the requested country from abuse of
its extradition process.' 2 6 Many courts, however, have inter-
preted these holdings to limit an individual's right to invoke
the protection of the doctrine of speciality. t2 7 Some courts
have interpreted these holdings as precluding the defendant
from raising the issue altogether. 28
3. Courts Questioning Standing
As courts began to adopt the theory that the doctrine of
speciality does not belong to the relator, but rather only to the
608. In so doing, the court offered a possible explanation as to why some courts
grant defendant's standing to raise violations of speciality. Id.; see infra note 229 and
accompanying text (discussing Caro-Quintero court's reasoning). By undertaking the
extradition proceedings, the court conjectured, the requested country may implicitly
vest the relator with the right to protest a violation of the doctrine of speciality by the
requesting country. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 608. The court stated that
by affirmatively undertaking extradition proceedings and limiting the scope
of the prosecution by the receiving state, the sending state implicitly pro-
tests prosecution on any bases not specified by the bill of extradition. This
implicit protest thereby vests the individual with the sending state's rights
and standing in that regard.
Id.
The court, however, held that the right to raise objections to violations of the
doctrine of speciality belongs to the requested country, and not the relator. Id. The
court maintained that "it is for the state, and not the individual, to initially protest
and thereby raise a claim that the method of securing a person's presence violates an
extradition treaty. The individual's standing to raise this claim is purely derivative of
that of the state." Id.
126. See supra notes 81-125 and accompanying text (discussing restrictive view of
individual rights by some courts).
127. See, e.g., Berenguer v. Vance, 473 F. Supp. 1195 (D.D.C. 1979). The Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia in Berenguer followed the holding in Shapiro
that the doctrine of speciality does not accrue to the accused. Id. at 1197. In Ber-
enguer, the United States had already extradited the defendant to Italy when the de-
fendant protested the U.S. consent to an expansion of the extradition order without
first granting him a hearing to contest such expansion. Id. at 1195. The court re-
viewed the treaty in question and determined that the United States as the requested
party could consent to an expansion of the extradition order without violating the
doctrine of speciality. Id. at 1197. The court in Berenguer, however, noted the lucidity
with which courts have determined that the principle of speciality is not a right of the
accused. Id. The court stated that "courts have been clear in their analysis that the
rule of specialty is not a right of the accused but is rather a privilege of the asylum
state by which its interests are protected." Id. The court in Berenguer relied predomi-
nantly on Shapiro as judicial precedent. Id.
128. See infra notes 129-52 and accompanying text (discussing courts denying
relator standing to invoke protections of doctrine of speciality).
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requested country, the question whether relators had standing
to raise the issue developed. 129 The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit, in Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky,'3 ° questioned the
relator's standing to raise violations of the doctrine of special-
ity. 1 1 In Demjanjuk, Israel sought the extradition of the de-
fendant for trial under the provisions of the Israeli Nazis and
Nazi Collaborators Act.3 .2  The defendant argued that the
principle of speciality protected him from extradition for trial
under that law because the United States had no such law.'13
The court, however, rejected this argument by finding the par-
ticular statute under which the trial would occur irrelevant so
long as the underlying charge was murder. l3 4
The court also noted that the defendant may not have had
standing to assert the doctrine of speciality.' The court
based this assertion on findings by other courts that speciality
does not accrue to the accused. 3 6 By questioning the defend-
ant's standing to raise objections to the doctrine of speciality,
the Sixth Circuit lent further support to the theory that special-
ity protects only the requested state.3 7
129. See infra notes 130-52 and accompanying text (discussing courts question-
ing or denying relator standing to protest violations of speciality).
130. 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
131. Id. at 583-84.
132. Id. at 583.
133. Id. Mr. Demjanjuk argued that because the United States does not have a
statute similar to the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators Act, extradition for trial under
that statute would violate the doctrine of speciality. Id.
134. Id. The court stated that "the principle of specialty does not impose any
limitation on the particulars of the charge so long as it encompasses only the offense
for which the extradition was granted." Id.
135. Id. at 583-84. The court stated:
[w]e have discussed the principle of specialty because it was argued by
Demjanjuk and we have attempted to deal with every issue raised. However,
we feel constrained to note that there is a serious question whether
Demjanjuk has standing to assert the principle of specialty. The right to
insist on application of the principle of specialty belongs to the requested
state, not to the individual whose extradition is requested.
Id.
136. Id. The court relied on Berenguer v. Vance and Shapiro v. Ferrandina as sup-
port for this holding. Id. at 584; see Berenguer v. Vance, 473 F. Supp. 1195 (D.D.C.
1979); Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1009
(1986); supra notes 118-25 and accompanying text (discussing Berenguer and Shapiro).
137. See supra notes 113-17 (discussing theory that speciality only protects the
requested country).
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In United States v. Kaufman, 3 " the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit found that a defendant does not have the right
to complain about possible violations of the doctrine of speci-
ality.' 9 In Kaufman, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
(the "DEA") Agents and Mexican federal judicial police ar-
rested the defendants in Mexico pursuant to a Louisiana in-
dictment charging them with conspiracy to import narcotics to
the United States.' 40 Mexican authorities did not extradite the
defendants, but placed them on a commercial flight to Louisi-
ana with the DEA agents.' 4' The Louisiana proceedings re-
sulted in dismissal of the charges against one defendant and
conviction of the other.' 42 After the completion of the Louisi-
ana proceedings, however, both defendants were transferred
to Texas for trial on another indictment. 43 In Texas, convic-
tions resulted against both defendants. 4 4 On appeal the de-
fendants argued that their trial in Texas violated the doctrine
of speciality because their arrest in Mexico took place pursuant
to the Louisiana indictment and not the Texas indictment. 45
The Fifth Circuit applied the Second Circuit's holding in
Fiocconi to the facts of their case and held no violation of speci-
ality existed.' 46 Looking to the underlying purpose of Rau-
scher, the Kaufman court determined that trial on a similar of-
fense in a separate jurisdiction would not be "an act of bad
faith against the requested country."' 4 7 The Kaufman court did
not reach the issue of whether the defendants lacked standing
to raise the principle of speciality because it found that the
138. 858 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1988).
139. See id.
140. Id. at 998.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1006.
143. Id. The Texas indictment named the defendants, among others, but did
not figure in the arrest of the defendants in Mexico. Id. The Texas indictment con-
tained similar charges to the Louisiana indictment. Id.
144. Id. at 999.
145. Id. at 1006-07. The defendants argued that an evidentiary hearing would
reveal that their removal to the United States was an extradition and therefore the
speciality provision of the United States-Mexico extradition treaty prohibited their
transfer to Texas for trial. Id.
146. Id.; see Fiocconi v. Attorney General of United States, 462 F.2d 475 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972). The court in Kaufman found that the facts in
Fiocconi were identical to the facts in their case. United States v. Kaufman, 858 F.2d
994, 1008; see supra notes 98-112 and accompanying text (discussing Fiocconi).
147. Kaufman, 858 F.2d 994 at 1008, reh'g denied, 874 F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1989).
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principle was not violated, and that therefore the issue was
moot. 148
The defendants in Kaufman then petitioned the Fifth Cir-
cuit for rehearing.' 49 The court reported that it had submitted
its prior ruling to the U.S. Department of State for review.' 5 °
The State Department responded that the court correctly de-
nied the defendants the benefits of the principle of speciality
because the right only belongs to the requested state.' 5 ' The
court subsequently denied the defendants' petition for rehear-
ing, effectively refusing the defendant standing to raise viola-
tions of the doctrine of speciality.15 2
148. Id. at 1009 n.5.
149. United States v. Kaufman, 874 F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1989).
150. Id. at 243. The Fifth Circuit's deference to the State Department seems
strange in light of the Supreme Court's finding in Rauscher, which specifically rejected
the proposition that "the rights of persons extradited under [a] treaty cannot be en-
forced by the judicial branch of the government, and that they can only appeal to the
executive branches of the treaty governments for redress." United States v. Rau-
scher, 119 U.S. 407, 431 (1886).
151. Kaufman, 874 F.2d at 243. The State Department reported that "only an
offended nation can complain about the purported violation of an extradition
treaty." Id.
152. Id. Five months after Demjanjuk, in United States ex rel. Cabrera v. Warden,
Metropolitan Correctional Center, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York held that a defendant has no standing to raise the doctrine's protection. United
States ex rel. Cabrera v. Warden, Metropolitan Correctional Center, 629 F. Supp.
699, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). In Cabrera, Colombia extradited the defendant to Florida
to answer various indictments pending there against him. Id. at 699. Due to a mis-
take in Florida, however, the defendant wound up in New York, where indictments
against him also existed. Id. at 699-700. After arraignment in New York, the court
discovered that the extradition agreement only authorized trial of the defendant in
Florida. Id. at 700. In his application for a writ of habeas corpus, the defendant
argued that his transportation to, and arraignment in, New York violated the doctrine
of speciality. Id.
The court found that the doctrine of speciality requires only that the defendant
not stand trial or undergo punishment for offenses not specified in the extradition
agreement. Id. at 701. The court held that because the defendant did not stand trial
or undergo punishment in New York, no violation of speciality had occurred. Id.
The court, however, also held that the defendant had no standing to raise questions
regarding violations of the doctrine of speciality. Id. The court agreed "with the
government that [the defendant] has no standing to raise questions of the violation
of either the treaty or the Rule of Specialty." Id. The court then sent the defendant
to Florida for trial. Id. After the conclusion of the defendant's trial in Florida, a writ
of habeas corpus ad prosequendum compelled his return to the Southern District of
New York to stand trial for the pending indictments there. United States v. Cabrera
Sarmiento, 659 F. Supp. 169, 170-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
Interestingly, when the court reviewed, and denied, the defendant's renewed
contention that his presence in New York violated the doctrine of speciality, it did not
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B. Courts Granting Individual Rights Under the Doctrine of
Speciality
Courts that restrict, or deny altogether, a relator's right to
raise a violation of the doctrine of speciality commonly hold
that speciality only protects the requested country.' 53  A
number of courts, however, have taken the opposite approach
to individual rights under extradition treaties.'54 Some of
these latter courts follow a constitutional analysis, similar to
the rationale of Rauscher, while others apply a jurisdictional
analysis. 55 The extent of the protection afforded the relator
varies according to the facts. Some courts, for example, ac-
knowledge the relator's right to raise violations of speciality,
but find that the consent of the requested country to the trial
of the relator on additional charges, or a waiver of extradition
by the relator, 56 effectively cuts off these rights.'
57
mention the issue of standing. See id. This may reflect the fact that the Second Cir-
cuit had addressed the issue in the interim. In that case, United States v. DiTommaso, a
defendant, arrested in Bermuda, attempted to argue that his trial in New York vio-
lated the doctrine of speciality. United States v. DiTommaso, 817 F.2d 201 (2d Cir.
1987). The defendant, however, was deported, not extradited, to the United States.
Id. at 212. He had waived his right to extradition from Bermuda. Id. The court
noted that:
[t]he form signed by the defendant was titled "WAIVER AND CONSENT"
and recited as followed: "I, VITORIANO MOLINA CHACON, having been
charged with an extradition crime within the jurisdiction of the United
States of America, hereby freely and voluntarily waive and forego all my
rights under the Extradition Act of 1870 ......
Id. at n.14 (emphasis in original).
The court in DiTommaso held that because the defendant had waived extradition
the doctrine of speciality did not limit the scope of prosecution. Id. at 212. The
court pronounced that "[w]e need not and therefore do not reach the separate issue
of whether an extradited defendant is ever entitled derivatively to raise whatever ob-
jections the extraditing country might have." Id. at 212 n. 13. Thus, the district court
in Cabrera Sarniento may have abandoned the contention that the defendant had no
standing to raise questions regarding the doctrine of speciality in light of the Second
Circuit's decision in DiTommaso. See Cabrera Sarmiento, 659 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
153. See supra notes 81-152 and accompanying text (discussing courts finding
speciality to protect only requested country).
154. See infra notes 158-200 and accompanying text (discussing courts granting
relators right to raise violations of speciality).
155. E.g., United States v. Vreeken, 803 F.2d 1085 (10th Cir. 1986) (applying
jurisdictional analysis to speciality), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1067 (1987); United States v.
Sensi, 664 F. Supp. 566 (D.D.C. 1987) (applying constitutional analysis), aff'd, 879
F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
156. See, e.g., United States v. DiTommaso, 817 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1987); see supra
note 151 (discussing DiTommaso).
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1. Consent by Requested Country or Waiver by Relator
Exception
In 1986, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
United States v. Najohn 158 relied on Rauscher for the proposition
that an extraditee may raise whatever objections to his extradi-
tion the sending country might have.' 59 In Najohn, Switzerland
extradited the defendant to the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania on charges of interstate trans-
portation of stolen property.160 While serving a four-year sen-
tence in Pennsylvania, after entering a plea of guilty to one of
the extradited charges, the U.S. District Court for the North-
ern District of California indicted the defendant on similar
charges.' 6 1 The defendant claimed that trial in California
would violate the doctrine of speciality as expressed by the ex-
tradition treaty and the specific language of the Swiss court's
extradition order. 6 2 The court in Najohn found no violation of
the speciality doctrine because Switzerland had expressly
waived its application.163
The Najohn court provides an example of how individual
rights under extradition treaties derive from those of the re-
quested country."6 When the requested country consents to
an expansion of the extradition order, or waives the doctrine
altogether, the defendant has no recourse through the doc-
trine of speciality. 165 Thus, the rights of the requested country
157. See infra notes 158-77 and accompanying text (discussing consent cases).
158. 785 F.2d 1420 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1009 (1986).
159. Id. at 1422. The court held that "the person extradited may raise whatever
objections the rendering country might have." Id.; see United States v. Rauscher, 119
U.S. 407 (1886).
160. Najohn, 785 F.2d at 1421.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1422. A letter from the Swiss Embassy to the United States agreed to
the suspension of the principle of speciality. Id. In rejecting the defendant's argu-
ment that the Swiss Embassy to the United States did not possess the authority to
suspend the doctrine, the court declared that
[t]o do otherwise would ignore the precept that courts do not intervene in
foreign affairs. While the specialty doctrine, conceived as a means for en-
forcing American treaty obligations, is a recognized exception to this doc-
trine, there is no reason to extend this exception to require courts to initiate
an investigation into the workings of foreign governments.
Id. at 1423.
164. See id. at 1422.
165. See id.
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under extradition treaties surpass those of the individual sub-
jected to extradition.' 66
In United States v. Riviere,16 7 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit undertook an extensive analysis of the doc-
trine of speciality, and the meaning of Rauscher.t68 In Riviere,
the Commonwealth of Dominica extradited the defendant to
the U.S. District Court of the Virgin Islands on charges of nar-
cotics exportation.169 Subsequently, the government dropped
the narcotics charges and filed an information 170 in the district
court charging the defendant with seven counts of firearms of-
fenses. 7  The defendant entered a conditional plea on some
of the firearms charges.' 72 The defendant claimed that be-
cause he was charged with a crime for which he was not surren-
dered, his extradition violated the doctrine of speciality.' 73
The Riviere court's analysis of the doctrine of speciality in-
cluded a lengthy discussion of Rauscher and individual rights
under extradition treaties. 74 The court found that the U.S.
Supreme Court's opinion in Rauscher suggested that individu-
als maintain rights under extradition treaties.' 75  The court
recognized that the defendant's rights derived from those of
166. See United States v. Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289 (3d Cir. 1991); infra notes 167-
77 and accompanying text (discussing Riviere and priority of rights under extradition
treaties); see also, United States v. Diwan, 864 F.2d 715, 721 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied,
492 U.S. 921 (1989). The Diwan court asserted that
[iun determining whether the prosecution of Diwan was a breach of the ex-
tradition treaty, it is essential that we determine whether [the requested
country] would regard the prosecution as an affront to its sovereignty, for
the remedy which Diwan seeks, and the arguments that she advances in sup-
port thereof, are derivative in nature.
Id. at 721.
167. 924 F.2d 1289 (3d Cir. 1991).
168. Id. at 1297-1301.
169. Id. at 1292.
170. An information is a "written accusation of crime signed by the prosecutor,
charging the person with the commission of a crime." BARRON'S LAw DICTIONARY
231 (2d ed. 1984) (emphasis in original).
171. Riviere, 924 F.2d at 1292. Apparently the firearms offenses were not extra-
ditable charges under the extradition treaty, and the defendant was thus extradited
on the narcotics charges. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1296.
174. Id. at 1297-1301.
175. Id. at 1297. The court stated that "[miuch of the [Rauscher] opinion sug-
gests that the rights described in the treaty are conferred upon individuals rather
than the government." Id.
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the requested country. 76 The Riviere court distinguished Rau-
scher on the grounds that Dominica had expressly waived its
right to protest any post-extradition proceedings in the re-
questing country.'77
2. Theories For Granting Defendants Rights
Courts that grant individuals the right to invoke the pro-
tection of the doctrine of speciality usually cite Rauscher for
support.' 78 The courts in Najohn and Riviere, for example,
cited Rauscher for the proposition that some treaties contain
provisions conferring enforceable rights upon individuals.' 79
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1300. The court stated that
[w]hile a treaty limits a nation's discretion to grant asylum, it does not
change its power to deny asylum. When a nation waives its right to enforce
extradition treaty provisions, it essentially refuses to grant asylum to the
fugitive for the offence involved. Inasmuch as Dominica expressly waived its
rights under the treaty to object to this country's proceedings after extradi-
tion, it effectively expressed its intention that it would not grant asylum to
[the defendant] for any offense for which the United States intended to
prosecute him, an act completely within Dominica's discretion as a sover-
eign nation.
Id. (emphasis in original). The court concluded that
in light of the Dominican waiver, [the defendant] had no right under the
treaty to return to Dominica at the conclusion of his case on the offense for
which he was extradited before the disposition of the other charges. Our
result, of course, does not emasculate the rule of specialty in the treaty be-
cause it still restricts the conduct of requesting nations when the asylum
country invokes its rights under the treaty.
Id. at 1301.
178. E.g., id. at 1297; United States v. Diwan, 864 F.2d 715, 721 (11 th Cir.), cert.
denied, 492 U.S. 921 (1989); United States v. Herbage, 850 F.2d 1463, 1466 n.7 (1 th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1027 (1989).
179. See United States v. Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289 (3rd Cir. 1991); United States v.
Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1009 (1986); see also United
States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 419 (1886); United States v. Levy, 905 F.2d 326
(11 th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 759 (1991); United States v. Diwan, 864 F.2d
715 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 921 (1989); United States v. Herbage, 850 F.2d
1463 (11 th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1027 (1989); United States v. Cuevas, 847
F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1012 (1989); United States v. Thirion,
813 F.2d 146 (8th Cir. 1987).
In United States v. Thirion, Monaco extradited the defendant on charges of fraud.
Thirion, 813 F.2d at 150. The extradition agreement specifically provided that the
defendant could not stand trial on charges of conspiracy. Id. At trial, however, the
judge would not dismiss the conspiracy count, but, instead instructed the jury that
they could not return a verdict under that count. Id. at 151. The trial judge did not
dismiss the conspiracy count because the trial could proceed on the count should the
defendant remain in the country for one month after having the liberty to leave. Id.
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Depending on the facts and circumstances of cases that raise
speciality, however, courts tend to adhere to different aspects
of the Rauscher decision. Some courts, for example, apply a
personal jurisdiction analysis,1 0 while others approach the is-
sue from a constitutional perspective. 81 Additionally, some
courts just assume, without deciding the issue, that the defend-
ant maintains the right to raise violations of speciality.
18 2
The defendant protested that this violated the extradition agreement and the doc-
trine of speciality. See id. The court, however, disagreed because the defendant was
tried only for the extradited charges. Id.
Notwithstanding the outcome of the case, Thirion is important because the
Eighth Circuit allowed the defendant to raise whatever objections to his prosecution
Monaco could have raised. Id. (citing Rauscher). Moreover, the court dismissed as
"without merit" the government's argument that the defendant lacked standing to
complain of a violation of the treaty. Id. Previously, no other U.S. court had so
found. See id.
In United States v. Cuevas, the defendant was extradited from Switzerland to the
United States. Cuevas, 847 F.2d at 1419. He was subsequently convicted on charges
of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and conspiracy to violate currency reporting laws.
Id. at 1421. Claiming that the currency related offenses were non-extraditable, the
defendant argued that the doctrine of speciality prohibited his prosecution thereon.
Id. at 1426. The court held that the defendant could raise whatever objections to his
prosecution that the extraditing country would have been entitled to raise. Id.
In Cuevas, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted the views of
other courts which deny the defendant standing to invoke the protection of the doc-
trine of speciality. See id. at 1426-27 n.23. The court, however, further noted that it
followed the opposite position. Id.
In Herbage, the court assumed without deciding that an individual has standing to
allege a violation of the speciality doctrine. Herbage, 850 F.2d at 1466. The court
noted that "there is a debate about whether, theoretically, the principle of specialty is
a right of the individual." Id. at 1466 n.7. The court, however, pointed out that
Rauscher "speaks of a violation of the principle as involving both the party extradited
and the surrendering country." Id.; see Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 422.
In Diwan, the Eleventh Circuit stated that the objective of the principle of speci-
ality is to ensure that the treaty is faithfully observed by the contracting parties. Di-
wan, 864 F.2d at 721. Therefore, the court reasoned, the extradited individual is
permitted to raise any objections that the asylum country might raise. Id. The court
based this finding on Najohn and Fiocconi. Id.; see United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d
1420, 1422 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1009 (1986); Fiocconi v. Attorney General
of the United States, 462 F.2d 475, 479-80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059
(1972).
Most recently, in Levy, the Tenth Circuit flatly rejected the government's conten-
tion that the defendant lacked standing to raise the issue. Levy, 905 F.2d at 328 n. 1.
The Levy court cited Rauscher as the case that created this right. id.
180. See infra notes 183-90 and accompanying text (discussing jurisdictional
analysis).
181. See infra notes 191-200 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional
analysis).
182. See Herbage, 850 F.2d 1463. In Herbage, the court stated that "[flor the pur-
poses of this case, we assume without deciding, that an individual has standing to
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a. Jurisdictional Analysis
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in United
States v. Vreeken,18 3 used Rauscher to hold that the defendant had
a right to claim speciality's protection. 84 In Vreeken, the de-
fendant waived his pending extradition to the United States
from Canada on charges of wire fraud.' 85 Subsequent to his
return to the United States, a superseding indictment charged
the defendant with thirty-nine counts of tax fraud.' 8 6 The de-
fendant claimed that prosecution on the tax charges violated
the doctrine of speciality.'
87
The court in Vreeken applied a novel analysis to the doc-
trine of speciality.' 88 Finding that speciality limits the court's
power to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the
court held that the defendant therefore had the right to raise
the doctrine of speciality.' 89 The court held, however, that the
allege a violation of the specialty [sic] principle." Id. at 1466. The court further
stated that Rauscher was "[t]he Supreme Court opinion which recognize[d] this prin-
ciple as involving both the party extradited and the surrendering country." Id. at
1466 n.7.
183. 803 F.2d 1085 (10th Cir. 1986) (defendant extradited from Canada on
charges of wire fraud failed to raise speciality objections in timely manner), cert. de-
nied, 479 U.S. 1067 (1987).
184. Id. at 1088.
185. Id. But see United States v. DiTommaso, 817 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1987) (de-
fendant waived extradition and court therefore did not address issue of standing).
186. Vreeken, 803 F.2d at 1088. The indictment consisted of thirty-six counts of
aiding and abetting in the preparation of false and fraudulent income tax returns in
violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2), and three counts of willful failure to file income tax
returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203. Vreeken, 803 F.2d at 1088.
187. Vreeken, 803 F.2d at 1088.
188. See id.
189. Id. The court stated that
[t]he specialty rule may initially appear to limit the court's subject matter
jurisdiction, because it bars trial of an extradited defendant on some charges
but not on others. But the extradition process is one whereby a court gains
personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Insofar as a defendant has a right to
claim the rule's protection, it functions to limit the court's personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant.
This point is emphasized in the very case that gave extradited defend-
ants a right to claim the rule's protection, United States v. Rauscher. There, in
applying the rule of specialty, the Court concluded: "[Wihile the court did
have jurisdiction to find the indictment, as well as of the questions involved
in such indictment, it did not have jurisdiction of the person at that time, so as to
subject him to trial (emphasis added)."
Id. (citations omitted). The court held that the doctrine of speciality is an issue of
personal jurisdiction and, further, that because individuals can consent to personal
jurisdiction they can also waive it. Id.
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defendant in this case had waived his right to protest his prose-
cution by failing to object in a timely manner.' 90
b. Constitutional Analysis
In another approach to the doctrine of speciality, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia found that the de-
fendant in United States v. Sensi '' had a constitutionally pro-
tected right to invoke speciality's protection. 92 In Sensi, the
defendant was indicted for transportation of stolen property
and was subsequently extradited from England.19 3  Prior to
trial, the U.S. government filed additional charges, including
mail fraud and possession of stolen securities.194 At trial the
defendant claimed that the non theft-related charges violated
the doctrine of speciality.' 95 The government argued that the
defendant had no rights under the treaty to challenge his ex-
tradition. ' 96
The court rejected the government's contentions, reason-
ing that, although the treaty in question was a contract be-
tween sovereign governments, it also acted as the supreme law
of the United States. 97 The court found that placing a person
on trial for non-extradited charges would not only be a viola-
tion of the treaty, but also a violation of the defendant's per-
sonal rights.' 98 The court concluded, therefore, that the de-
190. Id. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(f) provides:
(f) EFFECT OF FAILURE TO RAISE DEFENSES OR OBJECTIONS.
Failure by a party to raise defenses or objections or to make requests which
must be made prior to trial, at the time set by the court pursuant to subdivi-
sion (c), or prior to any extension thereof made by the court, shall constitute
a waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from the
waiver.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(f), 18 U.S.C. app. (1988).
191. 664 F. Supp. 566 (D.D.C. 1987), aft'd, 879 F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
192. Id. at 570. It should be noted that this is the same district that, six years
earlier, found the defendant in Berenguer v. Vance to be without rights under the rule
of speciality. Berenguer v. Vance, 473 F. Supp. 1195 (D.D.C. 1979); see supra notes
34-42 and accompanying text (dicussing Berenguer).
193. United States v. Sensi, 664 F. Supp. 566, 568 (D.D.C 1987), aff'd, 879 F.2d
888 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
194. Id.
195. See id.
196. Id. at 570.
197. Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. VI; supra note 53 (setting forth relevant text of arti-
cle VI).
198. United States v. Sensi, 664 F. Supp. 566, 570 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd, 879 F.2d
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fendant could invoke the doctrine of speciality to challenge his
prosecution.' 99 The court went on to hold, however, that no
violation of speciality had occurred, because sufficient facts
were proved to the extraditing magistrate to allow a valid pros-
ecution of the defendant on all the charges in the indict-
ment.2 0
III. COURTS SHOULD RECOGNIZE A RELATOR'S RIGHT
TO PROTEST VIOLATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE OF
SPECIALITY
The constitutional analysis employed by the Supreme
Court in Rauscher established a relator's right to face prosecu-
tion on only those charges for which the requested country
granted extradition.20 ' Since then, other arguments have
emerged that reinforce the Court's holding in Rauscher. First,
because extradition serves as a method through which courts
obtain personal jurisdiction over defendants, relators have a
statutory right to file a timely objection to protest a defect in
the court's exercise ofjurisdiction. °2 Second, by affirmatively
undertaking the procedures required to extradite an individ-
ual, the requested country implicitly vests the relator with the
right to protest possible violations of the extradition treaty. 0 3
Finally, courts refusing to recognize a relator's right to protest
a violation of speciality construe Rauscher too narrowly by rely-
ing on a purely contractual analysis of extradition treaties.20 4
888 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The court stated that trial of an individual on non-extradited
charges would not only serve as an "infraction of the contract between the parties to
the treaty, but also a violation of the supreme law of this land in a matter directly
involving [a defendant's] personal rights." Id.; see United States v. Lehder-Rivas, 668
F. Supp. 1523 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (applying same constitutional analysis thereby al-
lowing defendant to raise principle of speciality to contest trial on charges not listed
in extradition agreement).
199. Id. The court went on to find that the indictment did not violate the doc-
trine of speciality. Id. at 572.
200. Id. at 572.
201. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 418-19 (1886).
202. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(0, 18 U.S.C. app. (1988); see supra note 189 (quoting
text of rule 12(f)); see also United States v. Vreeken, 803 F.2d 1085 (10th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1067 (1987) (applying jurisdictional approach to speciality).
203. See United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599 (C.D. Cal 1990).
204. See, e.g., United States v. Fiocconi, 462 F.2d 475, 479-80 n.8 (2d Cir.) (hold-
ing that wrong from violation of speciality only results to requested country), cert
denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972); see also M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 364 (discussing
restrictive view of doctrine of speciality).
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An exception to the relator's right to raise violations of the
doctrine of speciality exists only to the extent that the re-
quested country expressly waives any treaty-imposed limita-
tions to trial.2 °5
A. Constitutional Analysis: The Rauscher Rationale
Prior to Rauscher, the concerns of many U.S. courts with
regard to the doctrine of speciality focused on whether a rela-
tor maintains any rights under the doctrine of speciality. 6
Rauscher resolved this conflict in favor of the relator.20 7 The
Rauscher Court specifically reviewed whether the relator had
"acquired a right" to freedom from prosecution on an offense
different from those set forth in the extradition proceeding.20 8
The Court answered affirmatively by holding that the treaty
had clothed the defendant with a right to exemption from
prosecution on the unextradited charge. 20 9 Furthermore, the
Court held that not recognizing the relator's rights under the
doctrine of speciality would amount to an "implication of fraud
upon the rights of the party extradited. 210
The Court in Rauscher reached this conclusion by applying
a constitutional analysis to the issue.2 ' Pursuant to the U.S.
Constitution, treaties are the supreme law of the land.2 2 The
Court reasoned that whenever the provisions of a treaty im-
pose a judicially enforceable rule affecting private citizens, the
courts may enforce those rights as they would rights growing
out of a statute.21 3 Thus, by divesting the trial court of juris-
diction to subject the defendant to trial on the unextradited
205. See supra notes 158-77 and accompanying text (discussing consent cases).
206. See supra note 45 (discussing conflict in courts before Rauscher).
207. See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886); see also Ker v. Illinois,
119 U.S. 436, 443 (1886) (referring to Rauscher as acknowledging such rights); supra
notes 55-58 and accompanying text (discussing Rauscher).
208. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 407; see supra note 52 (listing questions Court re-
viewed in Rauscher).
209. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 422; see Ker, 119 U.S. at 443. Interpreting Rauscher,
the Ker Court stated that the extradition treaty in Rauscher clothed the defendant with
the right of speciality. Id.
210. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 422.
211. Id. at 418-19; see supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text (discussing
Court's analysis in Rauscher).
212. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI.; see supra note 53 (citing text of article VI).
213. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 418-19 (1886); see supra note 55
(citing Court's language in Rauscher).
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charge of cruel and unusual punishment, the Court in Rauscher
held that individual rights under extradition treaties are judi-
cially enforceable.21 4
Justice Gray, in his concurring opinion, pointed out that
"'any person prosecuted in any court within the United States
has the right to claim the protection [of U.S. laws]. ' 2 1  Rau-
scher established that the rules imposed on private citizens by
extradition treaties are of a nature to be enforced by the
courts.2 ' 6 Thus, anyone prosecuted in a U.S. court pursuant to
extradition has the right to claim the protection of the doctrine
of speciality, as if he were claiming the protection of a stat-
ute.2 17
Moreover, immediately following the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Rauscher, the Court reaffirmed that the doc-
trine of speciality is a right of defendants.21 8 The Court in Ker
v. Illinois cited Rauscher for the proposition that extradition
treaties provide the defendant with the right to avoid prosecu-
tion on unextradited charges.21 9 Within recent years, a
number of U.S. courts of appeals have also held that, under
Rauscher, relators maintain the right to invoke the doctrine of
speciality.22 °
B. Jurisdictional Analysis
Extradition provides courts with personal jurisdiction over
defendants.221 Without establishing personal jurisdiction over
the defendant, courts are powerless to hear their cases.222 Ex-
214. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 433.
215. Id. (Gray, J., concurring). Justice Gray concurred only because he believed
the Congressional legislation providing the procedures for dealing with relators
spoke of this right. See id.
216. See id. at 407.
217. See id. at 419 (discussing treatment of certain treaties as statutes).
218. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
219. See id. at 443; see supra note 65 (quoting language of Ker Court).
220. See, e.g., United States v. Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289, 1297-301 (3d Cir. 1991);
United States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d 146, 151 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Vreeken,
803 F.2d 1085, 1088 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1067 (1987). The court in
Vreeken stated that Rauscher is "the very case that gave extradited defendants a right to
claim [speciality's] protection." id.
221. See Vreeken, 803 F.2d at 1088; supra note 189 (citing court's language in
Vreeken).
222. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (setting forth principles of public law
governing jurisdictional issues).
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tradition treaties are specifically designed to vest courts with
jurisdiction over criminal defendants.22 3 Thus, the U.S. Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure must be read to allow a de-
fendant to file a timely protest to the court's exercise ofjuris-
diction.224 Denying the defendant the right to invoke the doc-
trine would amount to a denial of the defendant's ability to
object to the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction. 22 5 Fur-
thermore, a party must be permitted to object to a court's ex-
ercise of personal jurisdiction in criminal cases to prevent in-
discriminate prosecution of individuals.226 U.S. courts may not
deny such motions, if filed timely, because this protection is
statutorily provided to all criminal defendants in U.S.
courts 227
C. Requested Countries Implicitly Vest the Relator with the Right to
Invoke the Doctrine's Protection
A relator's right to raise a violation of the doctrine of spe-
ciality is implicit in the extradition process. 228  Due to the
highly formalistic and time-consuming procedures involved in
executing and processing an extradition request, requested
countries rely on the requesting country to faithfully execute
their obligations under the treaty, and thereby implicitly pro-
test any treaty deviations.2 2 9 Thus, if a country initiates its
legal and diplomatic processes to arrest and extradite an indi-
vidual to another country, it implicitly protests any prosecution
of that individual to which it did not consent.230 Moreover, the
right to protest violations of the extradition treaty is vested in
the relator, because it is impractical to require the requested
country to monitor every trial resulting from an extradition.
223. Id.
224. See supra note 190 (setting forth text of rule 12(f)).
225. See Vreeken, 803 F.2d 1085; supra notes 183-90 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Vreeken court's jurisdictional analysis).
226. See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 433 (1886). The Court's hold-
ing in Rauscher confirms this concept by concluding that the lower court did not have
jurisdiction over the person to subject him to trial on those counts. Id.
227. See United States v. Vreeken, 803 F.2d 1085, 1089 (10th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1067 (1987).
228. See United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
229. Id. at 601.
230. See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 422 (1886) (stating that extra-
dition procedures taken by requested country protect rights of relator).
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Hence, relators are representatives of the requested country
and therefore may always protest a violation of the doctrine of
speciality.2 3'
D. Courts Not Recognizing Speciality As a Relator's Right
Misinterpret Rauscher and Neglect the Unique Nature of
Extradition
While U.S. courts and legal authorities generally agree
that the doctrine of speciality is designed to protect the inter-
ests of the requested country, it does not follow that the relator
therefore maintains no right to protest the doctrine's violation
by the requesting country.2 32 Nevertheless, the U.S courts that
have failed to regard the doctrine of speciality as conferring
any rights upon individuals continue to apply a restrictive, or
contractual analysis to extradition treaties. 33 This restrictive
analysis supposes that only the requested country possesses
rights under the treaty.234 In other words, because individuals
do not make extradition treaties, individuals do not receive any
protection pursuant to them. This approach to extradition
treaties has allowed some courts to deny the relator standing
to raise violations of the treaty, specifically, within the area of
the doctrine of speciality. 35
231. See Caro Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599. The court's opinion in United States v.
Caro-Quintero, while not based on Rauscher, is an excellent policy argument in support
of the implicitness of the right to protest speciality's violation. As it is impractical for
the extraditing country to monitor every trial and hearing resulting from an extradi-
tion, it necessarily follows that these rights of protest should be vested in the relator.
The only problem with this approach is that it would only seem to apply in the cases
of formal extradition. Nevertheless, the Caro-Quintero court does offer some solution
to this dilemma by declaring that unilateral abductions are violations of extradition
treaties. See id. at 601.
232. E.g., United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420 (9th Cir.) (stating that
"(blecause the surrender of the defendant requires the cooperation of the surrender-
ing state, preservation of the institution of extradition requires that the petitioning
state live up to whatever promises it made in order to obtain extradition"), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1009 (1986)). Id. at 1422; M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 360.
233. See Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 906 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
884 (1973); Fiocconi v. Attorney General of the United States, 462 F.2d 475, 479-80
n.8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972); see also United States ex rel. Donnelly
v. Mulligan, 76 F.2d 511, 512-13 (2d Cir. 1935); supra notes 81-152 and accompany-
ing text (discussing courts denying relator rights under extradition treaties).
234. See Shapiro, 478 F.2d at 906.
235. See Kester, supra note 1, at 1467. Mr. Kester states that the doctrine of
speciality "is the context in which individuals most often claim treaty rights." Id.
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The rationale of courts that take a restrictive approach to
the doctrine of speciality is precarious for two reasons. First,
U.S. courts applying a contractual analysis to extradition trea-
ties have misinterpreted Rauscher. Although the Court in Rau-
scher addressed the contractual23 6 nature of some treaties, it
distinguished extradition treaties.23 7 The Court held that the
basis for determining whether a treaty is merely a compact be-
tween nations, or of a judicially cognizable character, turns on
whether the treaty confers enforceable rights on the citizens of
the nations who are parties to the treaty.238 Courts that restrict
extradition treaties to little more than a contract conferring no
rights on the relator therefore misapply Rauscher, which recog-
nized the judicial enforceability of individual rights under
these treaties.
Second, applying the doctrine of speciality only to the asy-
lum country is neither just nor practical. This approach places
an unreasonable burden on the defendant to ensure that the
extraditing country protests any violations of the doctrine.
Moreover, many countries that extradite individuals to the
United States do not have the resources to monitor individual
trials. Surely this is an unfair burden to place on a defendant
in a system that places the entire burden of proof on the gov-
ernment.
CONCLUSION
Extradition law has evolved from antiquity to reflect a con-
cern for human rights now manifest in the policies which gov-
ern extradition. Until there is uniform agreement that the doc-
trine of speciality protects the rights of individuals, as well as
236. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 418 (1886). In Rauscher, the
Court stated that
[a] treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations. It depends
for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the honor of the
governments which are parties to it. If these fail, its infraction becomes the
subject of international negotiations and reclamations, so far as the injured
party chooses to seek redress, which may in the end be enforced by actual
war. It is obvious that with all this the judicial courts have nothing to do and
can give no redress.
Id.
237. See id. at 407.
238. Id. at 418-19; see Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) (for discussion of
contractual nature of treaties vs. treaties as law of land).
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countries, courts will continue to deny individuals the right to
protest violations of the extradition treaty. Courts must, there-
fore, recognize that relators maintain and can invoke the pro-
tection of the doctrine of speciality. This right stems from the
U.S. Constitution, U.S. rules of jurisdiction, the implicit pro-
tection extended by the extradition process, and the impracti-
cality of requiring requested countries to monitor proceedings
following extradition for compliance with the treaty.
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